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Milton M. Klein This is an extremely ambitious book, for in its relatively brief
compass it undertakes to discuss three aspects of the Jeffersonian era:
(1) the contest for control of the national judiciary, usually personified
as a struggle of the titans, Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall; (2)
the battle for reform of the judiciary at the state and local level; and
(3) the meaning of Jeffersonian democracy as a whole, as it may be
inferred from the judicial controversy. Of his three objectives, Mr.
Ellis achieves the first most successfully. He has more difficulty with
the second and raises more questions than he answers with respect to the
last. Despite its limitations, the book is interesting and challengingand, at times, irritating and frustrating. Legal scholars should be forewarned, however, that Ellis is writing neither legal history nor even
judicial history. Rather, his emphasis is on the politics of the judicial
controversy, as much within the Republican and Federalist parties as
between them. In short, Ellis has written a history of the politics of
the judicial conflicts during Jefferson's administration.
The story of the Republican assault on the federal judiciary under
Jefferson is a tale more than thrice-told. It occupies an honored place,
of course, in every American constitutional history and has been treated
by every biographer of Jefferson. Henry Adams, in his classic history
of the first two Republican administrations, described the confrontation
between Jefferson and the courts as a less-than-heroic struggle, with the
President emerging as a paper tiger, longer on rhetoric than on action,
and a traitor to his own principles for failing to curb judicial power in
any significant way when he had the chance.' Albert J. Beveridge, in
his extensive biography of John Marshall, 2 provided, with a moderately
Federalist bias, the fullest account of the judicial controversy. The effort to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801-usually described as a last-ditch
Federalist move to retain control of at least one branch of the federal
government-was, in Beveridge's view, essential to Republican efforts
to demolish Federalist power. If the Federalists could not be swept from
t Professor of History, University of Tennessee. B.S. 1937, M.S. 1939, City
College of New York; Ph.D. 1954, Columbia University.
1 1 H. ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1801-1805, at 255-63 (1891).
2 3 A. BEVERmD,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919).
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the bench, then the national judiciary "must be humbled and cowed." '
The failure of the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805 was
"[o]ne of the few really great crises in American history": 4 it rendered
the Supreme Court independent and left Jefferson in mourning over his
failure to subjugate the bench.' Edward S. Corwin, offering a milder
verdict on the outcome of the Jeffersonian campaign against the courts,
described it as "a fair compromise": 8 impeachment would not be employed against judges for partisan purposes, and the judges would refrain from partisan politicking.7 In his magisterial history of the
Supreme Court, Charles Warren assumed a somewhat detached and
dispassionate view of the judicial conflict: repeal of the Judiciary Act
of 1801 did not prostrate the court system; Marbury v. Madison was
not regarded by the Jeffersonians as an unwarranted exercise of a novel
judicial power; a proposal by extreme Republicans after the unsuccessful Chase trial to subject federal judges to removal by the President
upon the request of a majority of Congress received little approval from
the majority of moderate Republicans; the judicial controversy was not
a great struggle over constitutional principles so much as a difference
of political, social, and economic interests.' Such measured judgment
did not prevent a violently partisan Jeffersonian historian, Claude G.
Bowers, from luridly portraying the judicial contest as a struggle between a high-minded President and a judiciary infected with "bigoted
partisanship" and representing the outcome as a welcome purging of
the courts of "anti-American and morally criminal" practices. 9
Ellis insists that his book is "a revisionist study." " How much
so is his treatment of the Jeffersonian encounter with the national
judiciary? Despite his claimed attention to "complicated and subtle
political considerations," n Ellis' account of developments at the national
level is relatively uncomplicated, though it contains, at least, original
emphases. The Republican attitude toward the judiciary, Ellis believes,
was conditioned not only by simple opposition to Federalism, but more
so by deep-seated divisions within the Republican ranks. Extreme "Old
Republicans" looked not only toward the removal of Federalists from
the bench but also to congressional appointment and removal of judges,
and to limitations on the employment of common law doctrine in the federal courts. Moderate Republicans, by contrast, sought only to end the
3 Id. 19.
4 Id.220.
5 Id. 220-21.
6 E.

CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION

85 (1919).

7 Id. 84-85.
8 1 C. WMuN, THE SuPREM COURT IN UNrIED STATES HISTORY,

215, 232, 255-57, 267, 296 (1926).
9 C. BOwERs, JEFFERSON IN POWER 268-93 (1936).
10 R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS
REPuBLac viii (1971).
11 Id.
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Federalist monopoly of the judiciary. They had no objections to the
institutionalization of an independent judiciary and hoped through conciliation to curb factional strife and perhaps even to win over the
Federalists to the Republican cause. It was the latter course, says Ellis,
that Jefferson took. His famous first inaugural address typified his
conciliatory disposition: "We are all Republicans; we are all Federalists." He did not plan the destruction of the judiciary and was pushed
to greater militancy, albeit tempered by caution and restraint, only by
the uncompromising attitude of extremists among the Federalists.
The evidence Ellis offers of Jefferson's moderation is considerable.
He refrained from the wholesale removal of Federalist officeholders; 13
in the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 he sought only to reaffirm
Congress' constitutional right to establish and abolish courts; 14 he was
not disturbed by Marshall's pronouncement in Marbury of the power of
judicial review; " and he consented to the Chase impeachment only
because the judge's intemperate anti-Republicanism became too much
to stomach. 6 When John Randolph, the Republican leader of the
House, chose to make the Chase trial the occasion for promoting the
"radical" position on the judiciary, Jefferson withdrew his support and
encouraged the moderates in his party to vote for acquittal.17 For Ellis,
the real victors in the Chase trial were not the judges but Jefferson and
the moderate Republicans. The independence of the judiciary was preserved not by Republican blundering in the abortive impeachment but
by Jefferson's skillful outmaneuvering of the radicals in his own party.
Much of Ellis' argument is not entirely new. Corwin called attention to the moderation of the Republicans in merely reducing the
Supreme Court in size by their repeal measure of 1802 rather than
packing it with Jeffersonians.'8 Henry Adams emphasized that the
Republicans never raised the issue of an elective judiciary or legislative
control of judicial appointments.' Warren pointed out that Republican
criticism of Marshall's decision in Marbury arose from the Court's
claim to control the executive department by mandamus and not from
the Chief Justice's enunciation of the doctrine of judicial review.2 0 More
recently, William N. Chambers has shown that the Republicans under
Jefferson and Madison were moderates committed to undoing the work
of the Federalists rather than to pursuing a program of basic political
reconstruction that would exacerbate social cleavages by intransigent
12 Id. 22-35.
13 Id. 33-35.
14 Id. 51-52.
15 Id. 66.
16 Id. 79-80.
17 Id. 102-05.
18 E. CORWmI, supra note 6, at 63.
19 1 H. ADAms, supra note 1, at 297.
20 1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 248-55.
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positions.
Jefferson's latest biographer has also reaffirmed the essential moderation of the President's position on the judiciary.2"
In drawing upon established interpretations, however, Ellis has
taken a somewhat longer route to the conclusion that the Republican
crusade against the national judiciary was not much more than a
skirmish. Everyone except the radicals in Jefferson's own party seemed
fairly satisfied. Republican moderates, sobered by the impeachment of
Chase and by the earlier removal of Judge John Pickering of New
Hampshire, abandoned this tactic; Chase, of course, was pleased with
his acquittal; Marshall and the majority of Federalists were relieved by
Jefferson's restraint in attempting any further curbs on the court. Only
John Randolph, the eccentric "Old Republican," was enraged. While
one is tempted to agree with Ellis that the drama of the contest has been
exaggerated by some historians, legal and otherwise, it is difficult to
reduce the event to Ellis' modest proportions. Jefferson did come into
office embittered toward the judiciary for its partisanship against Republicans during the Sedition Act "witchhunt," and he regarded the
courts as the last bastion of the Federalists, from which they could erase
all the work of the Republicans. Jefferson was not temperate in his
replacement of Federalist officeholders. Historians differ on the numbers, but the best estimates say that some forty-six to fifty-nine percent
of the offices under executive control were swept clean of Federalists by
mid-1803, a larger housecleaning than that engineered by Jackson, the
"spoilsman." 23 Jefferson's moderation toward the judiciary did not
prevent him from entertaining, as early as 1803, the thought that the
Constitution should be amended to authorize presidential removal
of judges on the address of Congress,' a view he reiterated after the
mishandled trial of Aaron Burr in 1807.
However indecisive and improvised Jefferson's campaign against
the judiciary, the popular view, held by both Republicans and Federalists, was that a death struggle was being waged and that the issues at
stake were not merely patronage and control of the courts but substantive and philosophical concepts of law and government. To Federalists,
the assault on the judiciary was an attack, on the common law and on
the entire concept of a national judiciary, that, if successful, would reduce the availability of federal justice, elevate the state courts, and
21 W. CHAMBERS, POLITICAL PARTIES IN A NEW NATION 66, 177 (1963).
22 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIMfE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST

1801-1805, at 133 (1970). See also M. BORDEN, PARTIES AND POLITICs IN THE
EMARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 66-67 (1967).
23 Prince, The Passing of the Aristocracy, 57 J. Am. HIST. 563, 565 (1970)
(46%); W. CHAMBERS, supra note 21, at 181 (59%). See also M. SMELSER, THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, at 48-50 (1968) ; L. WHrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS:
TERM

A

379 (1951); N. CUNNINGHAM, THE JEFFER(1963) (concluding that slightly more than
half of federal offices were filled by Republicans in 1803).
24 R. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 71-72.
2
6L. LEVY, JEFFERSON & Crvn. LIBERTIES 80-81 (1963).
STUDY IN ADmINISTRATm HISTORY
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ultimately destroy the nationalist principle embodied in the Constitution."' Republicans agreed that the common law was at issue, but they
would just as soon cleanse the American legal system of this vestige of
English monarchy and aristocracy and replace it with indigenous law or
"natural justice." This was the essence of Republican ideology, and
therefore the attack on the courts was a necessary first step to promoting
republican government.27 It may well have been more than hyperbole
when Gouverneur Morris, a Federalist, said of the Constitution after
the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801: "It is dead, it is dead." 28 Ellis
is quite right in arguing that the judiciary issue defined the meaning of
the "Revolution of 1800," but he never quite explains how either that
issue or the nature of the revolution was resolved during Jefferson's
administration.
In the second part of the book, Ellis discusses the struggle for local
judicial reform in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. He
again sees the real contest as one between extremists and moderates
within the Republican party, with the Federalists often aligning with
moderate Jeffersonians. The demands for "root-and-branch" legal reform at the state level stemmed from popular hostility to the legal
profession, an antagonism that, while antedating the Revolution, became particularly intense during the post-Revolutionary years. Suspicious of the law, its mysteries, and its practitioners, radical Republicans
sought simple codes of justice, limitations on legal fees, the use of laymen as counsel in place of attorneys, and the substitution of arbitration
procedures for complex judicial process. Moderates responded with a
plea for codification of the law, systematic law reporting, improved
training of lawyers and judges, and a more efficient and uniform court
system. The contests in the three states Ellis chooses for discussion
were complex and tangled. What appeared to emerge, in his view, is a
victory for the radicals in Kentucky, where voluntary arbitration 29 and
a system of county circuit courts 3o were initiated; a comparable extension of local courts and authorization of voluntary arbitration in Pennsylvania,3' which Ellis chooses to label a moderate victory despite the
similarity to the "radical" outcome in Kentucky; 32 and another moderate triumph in Massachusetts, where Federalists organized a program
26 L. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN JEFFERSONIAN

AmERICA 143-47 (1970).
27 On the Republican view of the judiciary war, see Knudson, The Jeffersonlian

Assault on The Federalist Judiciary, 1802-1805; Political Forces and Press Reaction,
14 Azf. J. LEGAL HIST. 55 (1970). See also P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN
AmERICA 105-09 (1965) (common law issue).
28 M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 698 (1970).

29 R. ELLIS, supra note 10, at 137.

Id. 154.
31 Id. 182.
32 Id. 24243.
30
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of streamlined judicial procedures, improved education of the bar, and
"a meaningful common law." '
The account of these developments is interesting, informative, and
offers material that is not readily available in other publications,34 but
the relation between these local events and those at the national level is
bafflingly unclear. The arguments of the protagonists in the states
almost always revolved around the question of the prompt, efficient,
and reasonable administration of justice. The independence of the judiciary seems to have been accepted, and there was no serious effort to
substitute elective for appointive judges. The tirades against the legal
profession appear to have been more rhetorical than real, which is not
surprising considering the substantial number of lawyers among the
Republican leadership3 3 Radical arguments were not consistent. At
times, there were objections to the high cost of justice arising from the
multiplicity of local courts; at times, the complaints centered on the
inadequate number of courts and the infrequency of their sessions.
Bench and bar were castigated for their erudition and sophisticated
legalism, but local justices of the peace were also criticized for being
ignorant and unlettered. Codification was demanded as a safeguard
against arbitrary judge-made law but also opposed as the antithesis of
"natural justice." 36 Perhaps Ellis' difficulty is his unwillingness to
recognize that Americans entered nationhood with an ambivalent attitude toward law and the legal profession 3 7 that makes it hazardous
to use the designations "radical" and "moderate" to describe any position. The revolutionary generation was suspicious of lawyers but was
led by them; the colonists were hostile to lawyers but respected law.
In the early republic, Jeffersonians, although leary of its intricacies,
were reluctant to abandon the common law."8 James Fenimore Cooper's
frontier character, Natty Bumppo, expressed this attitude neatly: "The
law-'tis bad to have it, but I sometimes think it is worse to be entirely
without it." 9

From a historiographical perspective, Ellis has
"consensus" history, that is, a view of the American
gates the forces of class and sectional conflict in our
more agreement than disagreement in the shaping

thus far written
past which mitihistory and sees
of our national

Id. 229.
84 For a fuller discussion of the developments in Pennsylvania, see articles cited
in R. ELLIs, supra note 10, at 316 n.1.
35 In Massachusetts, for example, where Republicanism was not strong, 13.1% of
the legal profession was Jeffersonian in political affiliation. Gawalt, Sources of AntiLawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740-1840, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283, 295
(1970).
36 P. MIL.EI, supra note 27, at 104.
37Id. 241; see G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AmERCAN REPUBLIc, 1776-1787,
at 295-99, 303-04 (1969).
38 See L. Kmana, supra note 26, at 138.
39J. F. CooPER, THE PRnuE (1827), quoted in P. MILER, supra note 27, at 99.
3s
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tradition.40 At least so it appears from his attention to the victory, in
the battle for judicial reform, of moderates over extremists in both parties. But the inexplicable conclusion that Ellis draws from his analysis
is that the judicial contest really symbolized a struggle between two
sharply divided and long contending segments of American societythe democratic-minded and the elite-minded-the former comprising
the advocates of judicial reform and the latter, its opponents. The
democrats, according to Ellis, sought to fulfill the principles of the
American Revolution, while the elitists worked to frustrate those principles." Ellis finds the roots of democratic ideology in New Light
evangelical religion, anti-intellectualism, and agarianism; the elitists
were rationalists in religion and commercial in socio-economic outlook.'
This interpretation is in the tradition of "Progressive" American historiography, the very antithesis of consensus history.43
There is neither space nor time to dissect fully the limitations of
this simplistic interpretation of the evolution of American democracy. 44
It is enough, however, to call attention to a few significant exceptions
to the generalizations that Ellis himself concedes are anomalous.
Perhaps the most vigorous advocates of "radical" judicial reform at the
state level were Benjamin Austin of Boston and William Duane of
Philadelphia, yet both of these "democrats" were commercial and urban
in outlook, and, if either was evangelical, Ellis provides no such evidence. The most agrarian-minded Republicans, on the other hand,
were the planters from the economically declining tobacco regions of
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Uncompromising "democrats," 45they were nevertheless hostile to a radical program of judicial
reform.
Despite these and other exceptions, Ellis insists that there is a
dialectic to the period 1776-1815, originating with a conflict between
the aristocrats who controlled American society on the eve of the Revolution and the aspiring democrats. Independence ousted the colonial
oligarchs and "ushered in the age of the demagogue," typified, says
Ellis, by John Hancock, George Clinton, and Patrick Henry.4 The
Constitution was a victory for the counter-revolutionary commercial
community, 47 but true democrats reorganized under Jefferson to restrain

business and restore agrarian values. Immediately after their victory in
40 See generally Higham, The Cult of the American Consensus, 27 COmMENTARY
93 (1959).
41 R. Ems, supra note 10, at 250, 252-53.
42 Id. 253-59, 261.
43 See Crowe, The Emergence of Progressive History, 27 J. HIST. IDEAS 109
(1966).
44

For an extended critique of progressive history, see R. HOFSTADTER, THE
PROGmESSIV HISTORANS (1968).
45 R. EIus, supra note 10, at 260-61.

46 Id. 268-71.

47 Id. 271.
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1800, however, the Republicans split into moderate and radical wings.48
The ultimate triumph of the moderates is the synthesis of Ellis' dialectic,
constituting "the real meaning of Jeffersonian Democracy," " and
representing the reconciliation of democracy and business enterprise
and the defeat of "negativist popularistic" agrarianism."' Apart from
all its curious inconsistencies, its unsupported generalizations, and its
remarkable conclusion, Ellis' analysis says little about the role of the
judiciary and the issue of judicial reform in the evolution of Jeffersonian
democracy, presumably the central focus of his book. Perhaps the most
charitable observation one might make of the last section of the book is
that it requires a volume of its own. Mr. Ellis is imaginative and
thoughtful, and he writes vigorously and perspicaciously. One hopes
that he will enlarge upon his provocative, though largely unproven,
conclusion in another book. Until then, the present volume will stand
as a contribution to the still unwritten history of American law and the
American judiciary; raising questions concerning the relation between
law and politics, it charts the course which must be followed if legal and
judicial history is to be more than a chronicle of judges, lawyers,
and court decisions. More than a century ago Alexis de Tocqueville
perceptively called attention to the close connection between law and
politics, observing that "[S]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." '51 Mr. Ellis wisely understands the significance of this
observation.
48 Id. 275.

49 Id.277.
50 Id.284.
51 1 A. DE TocQuEvux.z, DEmocmcY

IN AMEICA

280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).

CITY OF NEW YORK: CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN FOR
1971. By EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL. New York, 1970. Pp. ii, 120.
James R. Cavanaught
The statistics are startling: an annual police budget of $638 million; 1 an annual homicide rate in excess of one thousand persons; 2
robberies at a rate of 60,000 a year 3 -burglaries 170,000; ' and almost
50,000 persons employed by the city government who are directly involved in crime control.' The galaxy of agencies, institutions, commissions, societies, task forces, and projects committed to the problem
is awesome. A review of existing criminal justice programs typically
identified by acronyms-YSB, HSA, ROR, ASA, MAP, NACC,
LIFT-boggles the mind of the uninitiated.
Faced with the enormity of the crime problem and the patchwork
of federal, state, city, and private facilities aimed at solving the problem, New York City established the Criminal Justice Coordinating
Council (CJCC) in 1970 to develop a coordinated approach to criminal
justice problems." This agency has assumed the responsibility for expenditures of funds available to New York City by reason of federal
grants pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.' As an outgrowth of this responsibility the Commission has
published its Criminal Justice Plan for 1971. In well-organized and
readable form, the publication describes a plan for disbursement of some
$17.5 million expected to be available for New York City in 1971
through the federal program and required matching funds.'
After citing statistics to demonstrate that crime has reached
epidemic proportions, the Council finds the growth of the phenomenon
has reached a "socially intolerable level" because the general citizenry
is now restricted in its movements and often required to alter its basic
patterns of life. While making this sociological observation, however,
the Council makes the concessions that the criminal justice system,
unfortunately, can only treat symptoms, and that dealing with the
- Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pa.
College; LL.B. 1956, University of Pennsylvania.

B.S. 1953, St. Joseph's
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2Id. 5.
3 Id.

4 Id.

DId. 10.
6Id. 98 (Copy of N.Y.C. Fxec. Order No. 6 (Apr. 6, 1970), as corrected by
errata sheet dated Mar. 19, 1971).
7 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 47,
48 U.S.C.), as amended.
8 CRAL JUsTIcE PLAN, supra note 1, at 3.
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causes of criminal behavior is beyond the scope and capability of the
criminal justice system. While it would be unfair to fix upon the
criminal justice system the sole responsibility for determining the causes
of crime, certainly the armies of men and millions of dollars ($843
million in New York City in 1970-1971 9) available to the system should
allow it to carry a fair share of the burden of ferreting out the roots
of the increase in the incidence of crime in our country today.
Within its self-limiting purpose of helping the criminal justice
system to treat the symptoms of crime, however, the Council makes
some notable contributions. For those who simplistically argue that the
answer to the crime problem is more police, the study notes that the
New York Police Department, with a manpower quota of 39,026,10 is
the largest in the world and that the diffuse demands upon the police
bureaucracy are such that at present it would take ten new men to
increase the force on the street by one man! "
Rejecting as a solution expenditures for more police, the Council
proceeds to establish a list of the five problems it views as most critical
and therefore deserving of priority:
(1) failure of the adjudicatory system to process cases;
(2) spreading narcotics addiction;
(3) conditions in the jails;
(4) lack of rehabilitation programs;
(5) lack of programs for juvenile crime prevention. 2
Although (3) and (4) are parts of the same problem, no thoughtful
critic could argue with the Council's priorities for the use of available
funds.
Of major interest to lawyers and judges is the fact that the
Council has given top priority to needs for improving the court system.
Using the guideline of improving court efficiency while assuring due
process, the Plan recognizes three "paths of reform." First, it proposes
taking certain forms of undesirable conduct such as parking violations
and violations of various codes-including housing, health, sanitation,
liquor, and business regulations-out of the court system.' The second
path is diversion of narcotics addicts, alcoholics, and certain minor
offenders with high rehabilitation potential, to treatment before (and
presumably instead of) criminal processing.14 Finally, efforts are to be
made to seek alternatives to the enforcement of private, and social, moral
standards through the criminal law.' 5 Specifically mentioned are laws
making criminal such conduct as gambling, abortion, homosexuality,
9Id. 11.
'0Id. 10.
"1 Id. 13.

3. Id. 29 (paraphrased).
13 Id. 33.

14 Id. 34.
15Id.
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and pornography. Numerous specific recommendations relating to
court management and procedure are suggested. The recommendations
seek to achieve maximum efficient allocation of court time.
Recommendations for the other priority areas--drug addiction,
juvenile detention, and rehabilitation problems-are well considered and
far-reaching. They range from employment of familiar ideas, such as
the release-on-recognizance (ROR) bail alternatives and the workrelease-program jail sentence, to support for such innovative and
specialized programs as the Education Alliance, which deals with girl
gang members and their families.
What does the Criminal Justice Planmean to lawyers and judges?
For one thing it must be noted that the court system itself is but a small
part of one of the recognized areas of criminal justice activity. Moreover, the study explicitly states that a paramount aim is to divert as
much activity as possible away from the criminal justice systemwitness the three paths of reform outlined above. Of the proposed
expenditures of $17.5 million, only $2.5 million are to be assigned to
the courts for criminal justice projects,' 6 a sum significantly less, for
example, than the $3.5 million earmarked for extrajudicial narcotics
programs alone.' One recognizes in the CriminalJustice Plan concrete
evidence of long-suspected erosion of our court system as the keystone
of criminal justice. The courts in their traditional role as arbiters of
human conduct and providers of forums for determination of guilt or
innocence, may, to some extent at least, be irrelevant to today's special
problems. Is the helpless narcotics addict who wins his motion to
suppress because of an illegal search better or worse off than the addict
who is found guilty and, as a result, placed in a well-organized drug
treatment program provided by public funds? If the goals of the
Criminal Justice Plan are achieved, it is suggested that in all but the
purest courtroom-type cases-such as a lying-in-wait homicide, or a
planned burglary (by a nonaddict)-the lawyer will play a secondary
role to the social worker, the educator, and perhaps the psychiatrist.
While this may shock the lawyer who has been trained to believe that
the prime object of the criminal justice system is the determination of
guilt or innocence, careful students of the problem should agree that
most of what the Criminal Justice Plan for 1971 suggests makes good
sense and that perhaps the legal profession has hoarded criminal justice
to the detriment of society. On sober reflection, the direction staked
out by the Plan may lead to the salvation of our court system. It may
herald a recognition that our courts were never intended to be used as
healers of social ills or dictators of public morals. Only if this occurs
will our great system be placed in proper perspective. The Criminal
Justice Plan for 1971 warrants consideration by the entire legal
community.
16 Id. 95.

17Id.
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FEDERAL TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE. By
BERNARD WOLFMAN.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971.
Pp. x, 1095. $14.50.
Fred C. Chandler, Jr.'
This work represents a high attainment of legal scholarship by an
eminently qualified craftsman. For teachers of corporate tax law who
prefer the case method, it offers an excellent pedagogical vehicle. While
prior works have encompassed in one casebook both the individual and
corporate areas of taxation, Dean Wolfman's concentration on the corporate tax area provides a wider coverage of this field than has previously been offered.
The detailed and useful table of contents reflects the breadth of
coverage; the book includes both the traditional areas of corporate
taxation and a number of areas that have no individual counterpart and
that are not generally included in a work of this nature. To keep the
book to a manageable size, however, several topics in the first two
chapters are treated in one or two paragraphs or in one page. As one
would expect from the title, there is no coverage of nonbusiness estates,
trusts, and tax exempt organizations. Also excluded is the special tax
treatment of banks, insurance companies, cooperatives, exempt farmers'
cooperatives, and farming. In fact, the sole departure from the field of
corporate taxation consists of a limited chapter on partnerships, "intended to illustrate some of the structural questions and to provide a
basis for comparison with the tax treatment of corporations under Subchapter C and Subchapter S of the Code." 1
Organizationally, there is a substantial departure from the usual
approach of treating together all tax aspects of a particular transaction.
Chapter 1 deals with the impact of the corporation income tax on
corporate transactions, while Chapter 2 is concerned primarily with the
effect of distributions and dispositions on shareholders under the individual income tax. It may be helpful to separate certain aspects of
corporate tax treatment from shareholder tax treatment of the same
transactions as Dean Wolfman has done in Chapters 1 and 2, thus
permitting organic development and policy analysis. He may, however,
have introduced some confusion by further separating the tax aspects
of single transactions; the effect of this choice of structures is to intersperse various tax aspects of corporate distributions with a discussion
of the sale and purchase of assets, receipt of capital, incidence of the
corporate income tax, and general information on the individual income
tax. Some might even prefer, from an organizational standpoint, that
t Associate
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no separation of single transactions be undertaken and that the corporate tax and individual tax aspects of distributions be treated
together.
Chapter 3, which is relatively short, takes up incorporation, and
those preferring to use this as their beginning point should encounter no
problem in doing so. It covers the tax effects on both the corporation
and the investor of transactions involving the incorporation of assets.
Chapter 4 is massive (340 pages) but presents a well-organized picture
of stock dividends, reorganizations, carryovers, and a glimpse of the
foreign aspects of these topics. Chapter 4 rounds out Part I (the
"core"), which Dean Wolfman has designed for a three-semester-hour
offering. Those teaching a three-hour course may desire to delete
areas of Part I-for example, foreign corporations-and substitute
selections from Part II, which is comprised of chapters on partnerships,
"small business" corporations, the accumulated earnings tax, personal
holding companies, and finally a kind of "catch-all" chapter, The
CorporateIdentity-Special Problems. While Part II is designed for
a two hour "advanced" course, portions of it could easily be added to
Part I for a four-hour offering.
As the preface states, it is assumed that students using this book
will have "the background of a basic federal income tax course covering
the pervasive issues pertinent to both corporate and non-corporate taxpayers." " Presumably the students' prior experience, while limited to
areas in which the corporate and individual income taxes overlap, would
at least extend to the tax aspects of ordinary corporate business operations. Since Dean Wolfman has omitted treatment of the latter, one
might wish to consider whether one's basic tax course sufficiently
covered the corporate aspects of such areas as cost of goods sold, depreciation, losses, bad debts, charitable contributions, and tax accounting. This book also assumes the background of a basic course in
corporation law, and perhaps in most cases the senior law student will
possess this foundation. But when this is not the case it will be desirable in the beginning to examine some general corporate definitions,
for the book contains no vehicle suitable for this purpose beyond the
possible starting point of the materials on professional corporations and
associations.
As the follow-up of a temporary edition by Dean Wolfman, published in 1969, the present edition adds, as Part B of the Appendix, a set
of problems which have been used at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School in planning seminars and in examinations. The problems
are presented "in the hope that they may be useful to others as vehicles
for classroom discussion and analysis as well as for study and review." '
While the problems may, as suggested, be useful in the classroom, some
of them are of such complexity that a thorough treatment would require
2 Id.

3 Id.1067.
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several sessions. Although access to them should also be helpful to
students seeking a better grasp of some of the more difficult areas of
corporate taxation, probably their greatest value will be for use in
seminars.
Dean Wolfman expresses a strong preference for the case method
of teaching, and toward this end his cases are well chosen with an
effective balance among those that might be useful as landmark,
historical, explanatory, and problem-presenting cases. Some would
prefer that many of the problem cases, which comprise about one-third
of the total, be omitted in favor of specially drafted problems and additional commentary. The case selections are current, however, including
decisions dealing with the relatively new idea of avoidance of section
351 and cases reflecting the recent revival of interest in "F" reorganizations. Relevant changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 are
reflected, revenue rulings and procedures are used effectively, and the
author's notes contain provocative and challenging questions.
For those who wish a more particularized development in certain
situations, this book might be complemented, as the preface suggests, by
referring students to a detailed textual work such as the distinguished
Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders by Professors Bittker and Eustice. Dean Wolfman has made no effort to make
his book both a teaching tool and a handbook for practitioners, and has
limited his commentary and notes to matters that will be useful to
students. For those who are convinced that the case method is the best
approach to teaching corporate taxation and for new teachers who wish
to try this method, Dean Wolfman has provided a first-rate casebook.

